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Looking Back, Looking Forward: Feminist Legal Scholarship in SLS
Abstract:
This article offers a review of shifts in feminist legal theory since the early 1990s. We first
use our respective histories and fields of expertise to provide a brief overview and highlight
some key themes within feminist legal theory. We then examine Social & Legal Studies,
asking whether it has met its key goal of integrating feminist analyses at every level. Our
review suggests that SLS has offered many important contributions to feminist legal
scholarship but has not fulfilled its lofty goal of integrating feminist analyses at every level of
scholarship. It features feminist work quite consistently and some degree of mainstreaming is
evident, as is the international reach of SLS. Too many articles fail, however, to incorporate or
even mention feminist approaches. We end with thoughts about, and hopes for, the future of
legal feminism, examining efforts to revitalize the field and suggesting possible directions for
the future.
Keywords: Feminist Legal Studies, Law and Gender, Feminist Legal Theory, the State,
Materialist Feminism
Social & Legal Studies has four main aims [including] … the integration of feminist
analyses at every level of scholarship.
With these words the editors of Social & Legal Studies (SLS) signaled a major commitment
to feminist scholarship in their first Editorial (1992: 5). There was no shortage of feminist
scholars to provide content when the journal was born in 1992. The number of women in
legal academia and related fields began to increase during the 1980s and, especially, the
1990s. Feminist literature grew exponentially, even if it took some time for women to
achieve numeric equality. Not all women law professors held feminist worldviews and then,
as now, some who did published in fields often not assumed to be directly relevant to
feminist legal theory (e.g. Sarra 2013). Nevertheless, the entry of feminists into academia
had a significant impact on legal scholarship (Bartlett 2012, 383-386; Davies 2007: 651)1
and some male legal scholars also published work that was influenced by feminist
perspectives.
Feminist legal theory has as its focus women and law, but in recent decades, much feminist
scholarship has problematized both concepts (Painter 2015). Feminist scholars working in
law schools, as well as in sociology, philosophy, criminology and other disciplines have drawn
on a variety of theoretical sources and developed the field in ways that have influenced law
reform and litigation, while also critiquing some of those reform efforts, narratives of
progress, and strategies for achieving equality and liberation. Many feminist legal scholars
continue to draw on studies outside law (Davies 2007: 651), and some have home disciplines
other than law, as is evident in SLS (e.g. Ahmed 1993, Smart 1992).
This article offers a review of shifts in feminist legal theory since the early 1990s. Because
we represent different generations of feminist legal scholars, we first use our respective
By 1993, 28% of Canadian law professors were women (Canadian Bar Association 1993,
49) in contrast to only 12% in 1971-72 (Bich 1992, 58). In many law faculties, women now
constitute 50% of academic staff.
1
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histories and fields of expertise to provide a brief overview and highlight some key themes
within feminist legal theory. We then examine SLS itself, asking whether it has met its key
goal of integrating feminist analyses at every level. We end with thoughts about, and hopes
for, the future of legal feminism.
Situating ourselves and the field
Our histories in legal academia began during different periods in the trajectory of feminist
legal theory. Susan was a junior academic in the mid 1980s when feminist law professors
were a minority, but interest in applying feminist theory to law accelerated. Even then,
scepticism arose about the extent to which law or legal rights alone can provide remedies for
inequality. Reflecting a heightened appreciation of the complex factors at work in sustaining
inequality, many feminist interventions moved away from formal legal equality towards
approaches that take structural impediments seriously. This work accepted the challenges of
feminists who pointed to the limits of formal equality in achieving meaningful change (e.g.
Lawrence 2006) due to its elision of substantive inequalities. In countries such as Canada with
constitutional equality guarantees, considerable time has been devoted to considering which
theories of equality might best provide remedies for systemic inequalities and which fields of
law might most usefully be challenged to promote equality. This is not to say that scholarship
focused on equality was the only approach, even in the earlier days.
Indeed categorizing the different approaches within the proliferating feminist literature on
law was in vogue in the 1980s. In her early bibliographical work with Elizabeth Sheehy,
Susan used the then dominant theoretical categories such as liberal, radical, and socialist
feminism (Sheehy and Boyd 1989: 1-2; Boyd and Sheehy 1986). Only a decade later, in a
second annotated bibliography, these categories no longer resonated (Bouchard, Boyd and
Sheehy 1999). Entries related to Black, lesbian, aboriginal, and disabled women had
multiplied, reflecting, inter alia, the increased numbers of such voices in law and academia
as well as important litigation on questions such as equality and sexual orientation; equality
and disability. The rise of postmodernism and the deconstruction of universalizing concepts
such as ‘patriarchy’ also played a role in diverting feminist attention away from a focus on any
unitary notion of ‘woman’ as a subject. Concepts of power were rendered more complicated,
challenging the radical feminist association of oppression with male-identified culture, law,
and state (Davies 657-658). As Belcher (2000: 539) puts it, the feminist debate shifted ‘away
from the emphasis on how women differ from men and toward acknowledgement of
differences among women’.
Anticipating the rise of theories of intersectionality, Sheehy and Boyd highlighted the
‘dialectical development of feminist perspectives on law which helps us to understand and
combat the complex social construction of women’s oppression and must involve constant
attention to the interplay of gender, race, class and other factors shaping power relations
and domination’ (1989: 3).2 By the time of their 1999 bibliography, the title of ‘Intersecting
Oppressions’ was used as an overarching framework for several categories of identity and
oppression (Bouchard, Boyd and Sheehy 1999).3
Works from a class perspective, inspired by Marxist or socialist feminism, number fewer
than those in the other categories, despite frequent calls to attend to race, class and gender.
3 The actual categories were: Anti-Semitism, Class/Poverty, Disability, Elderly Women,
Lesbianism, and Racism. Works in these sections dealt with the intersection of gender and at
least one other factor that contributes to oppression.
2
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The trajectory of Susan’s family law work illustrates another trend: the waning influence of
‘materialist’ approaches to law. Whereas her earlier work in the family law field drew heavily
on socialist feminist critiques of how marriage, the nuclear family form, familial ideology, and
the sexual division of labour related to women’s oppression within capitalism, her later work
rarely referred explicitly to this ‘second wave’ literature (for a critique and call for a more
materialist feminist approach, see Boyd 1999). Nevertheless, critical analysis of the
consequences of (re)privatizing economic and caregiving responsibilities within the family
under neo-liberalism, which creates particularly onerous responsibilities for women, features
in her later work (e.g. Boyd 2010, 2013). As we discuss later, interest in materialist feminist
approaches to law has resurfaced.
Debra entered law school at a time when many of the above-mentioned shifts, notably away
from ‘grand theories’ and towards intersectional approaches to oppression, were occurring.
As such, her career mirrors the time frame that this article addresses and, largely, the period
during which SLS has existed. Her research engages with criminal law and punishment
practices, particularly incarceration and experiences of women as accused persons and
prisoners. Beginning in her student days, Debra has been involved in feminist legal advocacy
and prisoner rights organizations, and that community engagement informs her scholarly
work. In the years since Debra began her academic career in 2001, the global population of
women in prison has grown rapidly, increasing at a substantially higher rate than the men’s
prison population.4
Feminist and other critical criminological approaches influenced law and society scholarship
in the 1990s and 2000s, as feminists brought intersectional and Foucauldian analyses of
power to bear on the criminalization of women and girls (Hannah-Moffatt 2001, Naffine
1997) and connected aspects of women’s criminalization to features of the neo-liberal state
(Balfour & Comack 2014, Snider 2003). Also during this time, feminists have increasingly
attended to the role of state violence in criminalizing racialized and poor populations,
including Indigenous and racialized women, illustrating the difficulty of understanding these
fields without employing an approach that is attentive to the intersections of gender, race,
Indigeneity, and class. Since at least the 1990s, feminist scholars have turned a critical eye on
the extent to which feminist-inspired law reforms to address violence against women have
been absorbed or co-opted by punitive agendas and contributed to increasingly criminalized
societies (Snider 1994, Bumiller 2008). Some feminists, including Debra, have developed anticarceral feminist analyses following these insights (Davis 2003, Monture 2006, Baldry,
Carlton & Cuneen 2015, Parkes 2016). As described by Carlton, anti-carceral feminism is a
unique voice within the prison abolitionist movement, one “grounded in intersectional
feminist critiques, strategies, and actions driven to struggle against and undermine structures
of oppression that give rise to violence and injustice” (2016: 3), engaging strategically with
reform efforts in pursuit of decarceration and structural change.
In the next section, we use our fields of expertise (especially criminal law, family law, and
sexuality and law) to illustrate some key themes in feminist legal theory. There are many
substantive themes in the literature such as sexual and gender-based violence, work and
income inequality, and inequality in the legal profession, to name just a few. Our focus is on
It is estimated that the overall world prison population increased by around 20% from
2000-2015. However, at the same time there was a 50% increase in the number of
imprisoned women and girls (Walmsley 2015).
4
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the themes of strategic engagement; women versus gender; and choice and constraint, which
we view as cutting across subject areas and significant in understanding the trajectory of
feminist legal scholarship in recent decades.
Key Themes in Feminist Legal Theory
Strategic Engagement
Feminist legal theory has always been informed by, and grounded in, the need to engage
strategically with law to improve social conditions for women. Praxis remains a strong
element of feminist legal theory, reflecting strategic feminist involvement and scholarly
engagement with law reform and litigation. What has shifted are the dominant approaches
that influence the field.
Since the 1980s, an appreciation of the complexity of inequality and the intersecting nature of
oppressions has informed the trend away from universalizing theories focused on gender and
law or ‘the state’. It is our impression that less publication space has been devoted to works
exploring the more abstract questions about feminist legal theory per se than was true in the
1980s and, to some extent, in the 1990s, as grand theories about the sources of, and remedies
for, women’s oppression were challenged and dismantled. Nevertheless, the insights of
feminist legal theory remain highly relevant to such endeavours, even if less space may be
devoted to overarching questions such as the material sources of inequality.
Criminal law, particularly in the area of sexual and other gender-based violence, has been a
significant site of feminist legal scholarship, both informing and critiquing reform efforts.
Reforming the law of sexual assault in some jurisdictions, including Canada, involved
eliminating immunity for marital rape, a terminological change from rape to the gender
neutral sexual assault, the adoption of an affirmative standard of consent, and a rape shield
provision limiting access to a complainant’s sexual history. Feminists also advocated for
changes in police and prosecutorial practices around intimate partner violence, as well as new
sentencing provisions meant to take domestic violence seriously. They then watched as some
of these reforms, such as the rape-shield law and restrictions on access to complainants’
private records (Gotell 2001), were rolled back by courts. Many problems that women have
long confronted in fields such as sexual assault law are ongoing (Larcombe 2016; Craig 2016)
and are exacerbated for particular groups such as Indigenous women (Cossins 2003), asylum
seekers (Baillot, Cowan & Munro 2012), and women with disabilities (Benedet & Grant 2007).
Other reforms had unintended consequences such as the increased criminalization of women,
especially racialized and Indigenous women, who were charged along with, or instead of,
their violent male partners (Martin 1998, Majury 2002). How wartime rape is dealt with in
international criminal law also has taken up considerable feminist attention (e.g. Buss 2009).
Feminist scholars – particularly Black and other racialized scholars – also began to question
the impact of criminalization and mass incarceration of racialized men on communities
(Harris 2011).
The radical or dominance feminism of the 1980s and 1990s provided the primary conceptual
framework informing the earlier reform efforts, with its insights about power, male privilege,
and the way rape law has been written from a male point of view (MacKinnon 1983; McIntyre
et al 2000). This analysis had thoroughly discredited the myth of law’s neutrality and
provided a language for law reform to address violence against women through criminal law.
However, by the 1990s, the turn to postmodern theory, notably the work of Michel Foucault
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and Judith Butler, provided an alternative to dominance feminism’s totalizing view of power
and oppression, and complicated understandings of power, victimization, agency, and identity
in producing inequality in and through law. Some feminist legal scholars also asked questions
about the pervasive conceptualization of sex as a site of danger to women and called, for
example, for more theorizing of ‘yes’ to sex (Franke 2001; Kapur 1999).
Due to these differing approaches, criminal law has been a site of significant disagreements
among feminists, and the criminal prohibition of prostitution/sex work is a prime example of
these tensions at play. Feminist scholarship on this issue reveals familiar differences between
the radical feminist focus on the oppression of women and the sex-positive feminist attention
to the harms of criminalization in these fields, informed by post-structuralism and gender
theory (Munro & Della Giusta 2008; Bouclin 2012). Much of the recent feminist work that
addresses these issues, including that found in SLS, adheres to a decriminalization approach
that now dominates. Nevertheless, strong feminist voices still argue that prostitution is a
practice of sex inequality that is inherently degrading to women and girls (Benedet 2008).
Some of this feminist scholarship brings diverse methodological and theoretical tools, such as
ethnography and political economy, to bear in complicating the narratives of both
abolitionists and sex work decriminalization advocates about the relationships between
criminal law and sex markets (Kotiswaran 2008).
Feminist legal scholars have also highlighted the risks of engaging with the state’s punishment
apparatus in seeking to end violence against women, particularly in a neo-liberal political
environment that can mediate any positive impact and where punishment is not evenly
distributed across racial and class lines. While surveillance and incarceration grow, the state
retreats from its redistributive, socio-economic responsibilities to provide real safety and
empowerment (Munro 2013, 242). Indigenous feminists have called attention to the role of
state violence and colonialism in facilitating the current hyper-criminalization and
incarceration of Indigenous women and caution against ‘gender responsive’ prison reform
efforts (Monture 2006). The need to improve laws related to economic and social supports,
such as social assistance, is highlighted by many who are concerned about criminalization
(Cruz 2013; Balfour & Comack 2014).
Women or Gender?
Another notable trend is to focus less on the category of ‘women’ and more on gender
oppression, and its intersection with other axes of oppression such as race, class, and
disability. This trend stems from a desire to look at inequality more broadly and from the
influence of critical theorizing including critical race and intersectionality, postmodernism,
and queer theory. In describing law as gendered, second wave feminists meant that it was
male-oriented (Cowan 2013, 106) or organized around traits and experiences associated with
masculinity, thereby normalizing the power and dominance of men over women in a range of
ways. With postmodern and queer theory came a different understanding of gender and sex
in much feminist theorizing. Significantly, Judith Butler understood gender as performative,
generative, ‘always doing’, and sex as therefore produced by gender (Butler 1990). Queer
theory and attention to the experiences of transgender and intersex people fundamentally
challenged the binary categories of male/female and man/woman, positing instead a
multiplicity of genders, sexes, and sexualities.
Sparked by these developments in feminist theory and scholarship, many university
departments formerly called Women’s Studies became Women & Gender Studies or simply
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Gender Studies. So, too, law school courses called Women and the Law often gave way to
courses on Gender and Law or Gender, Sexuality and Law. These courses generally remain
feminist in orientation and include significant attention to discrimination, inequality and
violence experienced by diverse groups of women, while also broadening their focus to topics
such as gender identity, masculinities, and sexuality in law.
Feminist legal scholars similarly widened the scope of their inquiries. In Canada, a human
rights complaint concerning a transwoman who tried to volunteer as a peer rape counsellor
for a rape relief shelter generated numerous articles considering the implications for ‘women
only space’ and the very definition of ‘woman’ (e.g. Gotell 2011; Mathen 2004). Such shifts
away from focusing on women’s specificity raise important and difficult questions about the
extent to which the category ‘woman’ has meaning and the extent to which law should rely on
definitions of woman and man/male and female. In addition, the need to include in feminist
legal theorizing the experience of intersex, trans and other queer voices and insights from
queer theory has involved important and necessary ‘uncomfortable conversations’ (Fineman,
London & Romero 2009). Many feminist legal scholars would agree with Ann Scales (2009)
that the supposed ‘debilitating contradiction’ between feminism and queer theory is more
apparent than real.
Nonetheless, some suggest that as analysis has moved into fields further away from gender,
including sexual orientation, the distinctiveness of feminist legal theory has been diminished
(Bartlett 2012: 427) or is possibly not relevant (Halley 2008). Catharine MacKinnon cautions
that feminists are at risk of losing ‘meaningful delivery on civil and human rights for women’
(2009-2010: 177). Others suggest that the strategy of moving away from legal language
focused on women is important for feminism. One familiar argument is that a focus on
women, or women’s difference from men, risks defining women in a protectionist manner and
over-emphasizing their vulnerability. Another is that important possibilities are opened by
using the language of ‘gender’ and that feminism will be strengthened, not weakened as a
result. For example, Otto urges that ‘embracing sex/gender as a fully social category does not
mean forsaking feminism’s long-standing commitment to addressing women’s disadvantage’
(Otto 2013, 198).
Some shifts away from woman specific language in legislation have arisen from practical or
semantic difficulties. In fields such as family law that rest on legal recognition of ‘spouses’ to
distribute or remove benefits, it is difficult, for example, to recognize specifically female
disadvantage whilst also recognizing same sex relationships. As a result, many laws on
spousal rights and responsibilities have adopted gender neutral definitions of ‘spouse’, not
due to feminist concerns about reinforcing women’s dependency on men, but rather to
recognize non-heterosexual relationships. Only rarely do feminist legal scholars suggest that a
way to exit the eternal debate about whether or not to acknowledge gender based differences
in law is to argue for enhanced collective responsibility for economic wellbeing and caregiving
rather than privatized remedies that rely on spousal relationships. Although these voices
certainly exist and may be on the rise (e.g. Eichner 2016), it is difficult, especially in litigation
scenarios, to make such arguments (Boyd 1999: 379-382).
Choice and Constraint
Feminist legal scholars have subjected key liberal concepts such as choice and autonomy to
critical analysis, suggesting that few choices are unconstrained by the material and ideological
conditions surrounding them. For example, marriage, a quintessential contract that influences
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the lives of so many women, has rarely been a free choice for women, even putting aside the
fraught question of ‘forced marriage’ (Bunting, Lawrence & Roberts 2016). The choice to
marry ‘has been constrained by class, religion, race, nationality, family and social pressure,
ideas of morality and respectability, and, above all, financial considerations’ (Auchmuty 2013:
298).
Much recent feminist legal scholarship argues for nuanced, contextual, and gendered
understandings of choice. For example, in considering women in polygamy, sex work, and
surrogacy, Campbell suggests that ‘women exercise resilience, resistance and agency, and
make reasoned and deliberate choices, even when they live and work within oppressive
patriarchal contexts’ while maintaining that ‘the mere fact of recognizing women’s ability to
make choices in the face of imposing constraints must not serve to justify the state’s
abdication of responsibility for addressing gender-based discrimination’ (Campbell 2013, 2).
Empirical feminist inquiry and studies such as Campbell’s that allow women to speak to their
lived experiences (for example, in surrogacy, sex work, drug use, incarceration, etc.) can
complicate feminist analyses of victimhood and agency (Campbell 2013; Busby & Vun 2010;
Gregory 2010; Carlton & Segrave 2010).
Feminists have also complicated liberal individualist approaches by emphasizing that
‘autonomy requires constructive relationship through a person’s life’ (Nedelsky 2011: 39),
suggesting that ‘relational autonomy’ is more apt. For example, the care relationship between
mothers and children precisely enables children to aspire towards autonomy, whilst
simultaneously constraining that of their mothers. Moreover, care relationships remain
deeply gendered. As Young (1990) has suggested, women’s ‘pregnant embodiment’ – that is,
their more continuous physical experience in relation to children due to pregnancy,
breastfeeding, and care responsibility – prevents them from being able to opt in and out of
involvement with children in the same way that men can choose to do (but see Karaian 2013).
Women’s autonomy is thus arguably an even more unattainable goal than men’s, subject
perhaps to the possibility of transgressive caregiving (Kessler 2005). Indeed some feminists
suggest that autonomy is a myth (Fineman 2005).
That choices remain constrained even as women exercise agency is illustrated by a study of
the extent to which motherhood can be meaningfully autonomous even in an era that offers
more reproductive choice and fewer moral constraints concerning single motherhood (Boyd,
Chunn, Kelly & Wiegers 2015). Women certainly exercise choices to be mothers autonomous
of genetic fathers or partners, but nevertheless are constrained by many material and
ideological factors, including the law’s apparent desire to ‘find fathers’ for children. Interviews
revealed that ‘single mothers by choice’ typically plan carefully prior to raising a child and rely
on support networks of various forms, thus refuting any notion that their ‘autonomous’
mothering is conducted in splendid isolation. The study also revealed class aspects of the
‘choice’ to be a single mother. A woman who responsibly marshals the resources to be selfsufficient as a mother will be viewed more positively than one who relies on social assistance.
The first woman is also more likely to be able to negotiate the laws that surround legal
parentage. Finally, an excessive focus on choice can ultimately divert attention from the goals
of feminism, including the transformation of the conditions under which parenting takes
place.
Social & Legal Studies
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Smart’s influential article ‘The Woman of Legal Discourse’ published in the very first issue of
SLS (1992) explained how legal discourse creates a particular idea of ‘Woman’ and argued
that law is a site of struggle. This article reflected an effort to rejig feminist legal theory, taking
account of postmodernist approaches that rejected ‘second wave’ socialist and radical
feminist theories (Conaghan 2013). The inaugural issue also included an article by Dutch
feminist political theorist Selma Sevenhuijsen (1992), examining law’s discursive effects in
relation to the reconfiguring of the legal treatment of motherhood and fatherhood and the
importance of looking at the specific historical context of feminist claims. This focus on the
legal regulation of motherhood and reproduction was followed up in later issues (e.g. Belcher
2000, Diduck 1993, Fegan 1996, 2002; Sheldon 1996, Boyd 1996, Hacker 2005, Chunn &
Gavigan 2004, Lttichau 2004).
Several important feminist legal theorists published in SLS in the 1990s, asking ‘big’ questions
about the field. A few offered a nascent intersectionality analysis. Nicola Lacey (1992) offered
an important critique of the limits of liberalism, theories of justice, and the deeply entrenched
gendered (and racialized and classed) nature of the welfare state and the public/private
divide. Very much a product of the times, the work of Scandinavian feminists on ‘women’s
law’, reflecting feminist standpoint epistemology, appeared (Petersen 1992). ‘Women’s law’
highlighted the innovative challenges of feminist legal analyses that refused ‘to start out with
preconceived legal concepts from above’ (Widerberg, and Hellum, 1993: 372) and instead
began with women’s life experiences to better understand their actual legal situation (see also
Graycar and Morgan 1990). Petersen’s inquiry (1992) led her to focus on informal as well as
formal law, an approach she suggested was consistent with postmodernist legal theory.
Australian Margaret Davies ambitiously grappled with the problem of how women’s
knowledge is made the object of property, and then ‘patronized, abstracted, defended, and
subjected to rigid limitations’ (1994: 366), later extending her property analysis to queer
theory and praxis (1999).
Early SLS issues also offered important debates on ‘rights discourse’ and the merits of
engaging in litigation rooted in equality or human rights (Fudge and Glasbeek 1992; Thornton
1993), acknowledging feminist work in this field and flagging the role of new social
movements such as lesbian and gay struggles for rights (Herman 1993). Gotell (1995) used a
case study of the early years of Canada’s Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund to show
how translating feminist claims into rights discourse can reproduce an ‘essential woman’ and
erase the difference that race and class make in women’s lives. Lacey (1996) highlighted
feminist critiques of both rights and equality discourses as well as the risks of reformism, but
considered the potential for reimagining these concepts. In so doing, she echoed a point made
in the first SLS editorial (1992), the importance of integrating theoretical insights (e.g. from
critical legal theory and the sociology of law) with socio-legal research. Lacey noted the
Marxist insight that ‘the deep reconstruction of the legal has to be premised on the
reconstruction of economic, social, political relations: on massive changes in the configuration
of social power at every level’ (1996: 151). Asking whether law is irretrievably male, and
offering critiques of that notion, an early work by Ahmed asked whether rights necessarily
occupy a masculine, liberal discourse or whether they can be mobilized and embodied
differently to become ‘a site and signifier within a radical feminist politics’ (1993: 57). Ahmed
proposed a deconstructive and pragmatic feminist approach, suggesting that a feminist
politics of law requires a necessarily pragmatic ability ‘to differentiate between specific
citational practices according to the effects they may elicit on subject formations’ (63).
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Over time, the focus on ‘big’ questions about feminist legal theory seemed to fade in favour of
strategic feminist engagement with particular legal issues. SLS also published important
interventions illustrating the innovation and importance of feminist methods (e.g. AdjinTettey et al 2008). Angela Harris (1999) emphasized the need for intellectual communities
such as critical race theory to avoid the problems of identity politics and attend to ‘private’ or
process issues such as caretaking that are traditionally viewed as ‘women’s work’. A serious
consideration of intersectionality of race, gender and sexuality as well as strength in diversity
and coalition building is required. Increasingly occupying space were topics that traditionally
had received less attention, such as religion, gender and culture (Bakht 2015; Vakulenko
2007), trafficking, migration, and citizenship (Askola 2012; Wilton 2009), transitional justice
(e.g. McEvoy and McConnachie 2013; Sankey 2015), sex work (e.g. Fizgerrald and McGarry
2016), and transgender identity and experience (Cowan 2009; Sharpe 1997, 1999, 2007).
These and other topics require attention to intersectionality of oppressions.
Questions of longstanding feminist interest also maintained a clear presence in SLS, including
sexual violence, the regulation of marriage and relationships (Thomson 2009), motherhood
(e.g. Gregory 2010), and women in the legal profession (e.g. Rackley 2006). Even authors who
do not examine issues such as marriage through an explicitly feminist lens often reference
feminist scholarship and offer complementary critical analyses (e.g. McGowan 2016;
Osterlund 2009). Despite Sheldon’s concern in 1996 that abortion was slipping off feminist
agendas (1996: 90), a recent special issue of SLS edited by Mullally and Murray (2016)
featured feminist work on rights discourse in the abortion context and assessed how rights
gained may play out unevenly or problematically in practice. The regulation of reproduction
remained a focus of scholarship (eg Priaulx 2004; Toscano 2005). Moreover, building on
feminist insights, contributions to scholarship on masculinity and male (hetero)sexuality have
appeared, including Collier’s exploration of how the legal institution of marriage constructs
‘natural’ sexual intercourse (1992). Collier later published a piece focused on legal
conceptions of fatherhood and paternal masculinity (1995). Scholars such as Park (2012),
Ballinger (2007) and Gadd (2002) turned attention to work that masculinities do in
legitimizing sexual violence.
The use of law to regulate sexual conduct, particularly gendered sexual violence, remains a
prominent area of inquiry for feminist and other socio-legal researchers. Analysis in SLS often
draws on substantial empirical work (Larcombe 2016, Ellison & Munro 2014, Finch and
Munro 2007, Gunby, Caroline & Beynon 2013), including mock jury research and the reports
of medical examiners in rape cases, in addition to doctrinal and theoretical work. The writing
on sexual violence includes attention to long-standing areas of feminist interest such as the
standard of consent (Larcombe 2016, Arstein-Kerslake & Flynn 2016, Gunby, Caroline &
Beynon 2013, Rees 2010), but also male rape (Graham 2006), asylum decisions (Baillot,
Cowan & Munro 2012), and politically motivated sexual assault in Arab Spring protest spaces
(Tadros 2016).
Numerous examples of feminist scholarship in SLS consider questions of legal strategy and
effective (or not) reform efforts in areas such as domestic violence (Lewis et al 2001), sex
work and trafficking (Munro 2005), labour rights for sex workers (Cruz 2013), intersexuality
and the right to bodily integrity (Ammaturo 2016), technology-facilitated sexual violence
(Henry & Powell 2016), sexual assault (Arstein-Kerslake & Flynn 2016), and forced marriage
(Park 2006).
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Reflecting the influence of gender and queer theory, and the questions we raised earlier about
‘women or gender’, the pages of SLS include several articles by feminist scholars on the legal
regulation of gender identity and trans experience. Lamble (2009) examines the legal
invisibility of lesbian and trans bodies in the Toronto Women’s Bathhouse Raids, Karaian
(2013) problematizes ‘repronormativity’ by considering how the law conceives (or not) of
pregnant trans men, and Grabham (2010) considers how notions of time and permanence
figure in the legal recognition and regulation of people who are transitioning. A trilogy of
papers (Sharpe 1997, Sharpe 1999, Sharpe 2009) interrogate judicial attitudes, regulatory
regimes, and legislative changes on gender recognition and trans legal subjects.
Interestingly, extensive feminist treatments of choice, constraint, and autonomy do not
appear in SLS. Discussion arises most often in research on forced marriage (Shariff 2012), the
limits of women’s ability to choose in relation to abortion (Fegan 2002); Jackson 2000), and
trafficking or prostitution/sex work (Bradley & Szablewska 2016; Doezema 2005; Priaulx
2004). As well, Gregory (2010) problematizes choice under neo-liberalism in a nuanced
discussion of mothers who engage in prenatal drug-use, especially choice exercised by
women marginalized by race and poverty, to limit their reproductive capacity, including by
medical sterilization. For instance, a drug-user’s choice may be ‘constrained by the very
possibility that their (unborn) child(ren) may be taken away from them’ should they fail to
choose to limit their reproduction (Gregory 2010: 58). Finally, in discussing medicalization
and gender recognition legislation, Cowan (2009: 249) points to problematic consequences
that may arise due to financial constraints on ‘choice’ to pay for surgery.
Our review suggests that SLS has offered many important contributions to feminist legal
scholarship but has not fulfilled its lofty goal of integrating feminist analyses at every level of
scholarship. It features feminist work quite consistently and some male authors incorporate
feminist insights or concepts into their legal research (e.g. Leckey 2011; Keren-Paz 2005),
suggesting some degree of mainstreaming. The international reach of SLS is also notable,
moving beyond Europe and North America to offer articles on feminist and related struggles
in Africa and India, among other formerly colonized regions (e.g. Kapur 1999; Krishnadis
2007; O’Rourke 1995; Stewart 1995; Rai 1995). Too many articles fail, however, to
incorporate or even mention feminist approaches. As well, over time, our impression is that
the journal has featured fewer articles addressing feminist legal theory per se, as opposed to
feminist analyses of particular legal issues and debates. We have not tested empirically
whether this impression would apply across legal publishing venues and, indeed, the field is
so vast that it would be difficult to do so. No doubt the question of the merits of a movement
away from feminist legal theory and towards feminism as a strategic methodology would
generate lively debate.
Into the Future
We now turn to efforts to revitalize feminist legal theory and possible directions for this field.
Some feminists despair that due to the impact of neo-liberalism and other more socially
conservative forces, resort to the state (and law as a key state tool) to assist in remedying
gender-based inequalities is increasingly futile (e.g. Bumiller 2008). We suggest, however,
that feminist legal theory remains vibrant and that its diversity points to new possibilities and
avenues for critique and social change. As Painter points out, the ‘problem-driven impetus of
feminist legal theory contributes to its present-day heterogeneity’ (Painter 2015, 918). Over
the past three decades, feminist legal scholars have tackled more diverse legal fields, including
those that do not at first glance involve gender, such as environmental law (e.g. Scott 2016).
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We anticipate that feminist legal theory for the future will draw upon various theoretical tools
that have been offered by feminists over time, including those in the materialist tradition,
those from the deconstructionst or postmodernist tradition, and those from critical race and
intersectionality theory. Harris (2016) recently offered a critical analysis of the rise of
‘therapy culture’ (which promisingly brings a feminist ‘different voice’ of empathy, caring and
relationship into public spheres) and its tendency to ignore institutional and structural
inequalities and power differentials. Rather than stop at critique, Harris calls for feminist
engagement with therapy culture in order to render these problems visible. Her example
shows that feminist work is important in fields that might not take female subjects as their
focus (132). Harris’s article draws on different strands of feminist theory, including difference
feminism as well as materialist strands that point to the brutal impact of neo-liberalism,
especially on poor and racialized communities, and the need to restructure the state itself in
order to realize a transformative version of justice (Fineman 2010).
Materialist feminist approaches indeed appear to be making somewhat of a comeback in
feminist legal theory, even in the United States where feminist legal scholars rarely took them
seriously. Cynthia Grant Bowman recently presented a powerful argument for ‘recovering
socialism’ for feminist legal theory in the 21st century (Bowman 2016), as has Maxine Eichner
(2016). Bowman revisited socialist feminist literature and made a plea for recovering its
insights for feminist legal theory. She suggested that an emphasis on the incompatability of
capitalism with full human flourishing, especially for women, as well as on the importance of
economic forces (both production and reproduction) as essential explanatory tools would be
fruitful and would usefully guide strategic choices for women looking to law as a remedy. She
notes that socialist feminism generally acknowledged the interrelated nature of race, sex, and
class, and so would be consistent with an analysis that took seriously the need for alliances
between different groups (2016: 165-166).
Socialist feminist insights about the fundamental relationship between the sexual division of
labour and the limits of law reforms emanating from liberal feminist law reforms to both
public (e.g. employment law) and private spheres (e.g. family law) still resonate. Both second
wave socialist and radical feminist theories were highly critical of marriage and the
heterosexual nuclear family form for its oppressive enclosure of women (see Barker 2012:
129-144). Because capitalism relies upon patriarchal family arrangements, a symbiotic
relationship exists between the two systems (Bowman 2016: 141); as such challenges to the
sexual division of labour and to the privatization of the costs of social reproduction threaten
the existing economic system. In recent decades, the privatization of responsibility for care
and dependency within the family actually increased, coincident with the rise of
neoliberalism and neoconservatism (Barker 2012: 131). Women thus experience difficult
contradictions in their lives, with heavy demands made upon them in the public sphere of
employment as well as in the private sphere of family. These contradictions point both to the
limits of law reforms to date, which tinker with family law rules on compensation through
property and support law and make promises of ‘work-family balance’, and to the radical
potential of challenging taken-for-granted arrangements related to the sexual division of
labour. Therein lies some hope for future action.
Critical reflection on attempts to engage with the state also features prominently in the
feminist literature on violence against women and resort to the criminal law, discussed
earlier. Feminist scholars, particularly racialized scholars, have called for new ways of
responding to harm and victimization that understand incidents of personal violence in a
larger context of structural violence (Harris 2011). This kind of transformative justice differs
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from conventional criminal justice responses that are rooted in liberal notions of punishment
and individual responsibility, as well as from alternative restorative justice models that
feminists have critiqued as particularly inappropriate to address sexual and intimate partner
violence (Daly & Stubbs 2006; Cameron 2006). Calls for transformative justice ‘place antisubordination at the centre’ of responses to harm and reject an uncritical reliance on state
institutions, as well as institutions of civil society, including the family and ‘the community’
(Harris 2011, 58), both of which have been the location of oppression for women.
Crucially, calls for state action must go beyond calls for law reform. As Basu (2015) concludes
in her study on marriage in India, law forms only a small, if influential, piece of the major
rearrangement needed to transform structural problems such as the gendered dependency
of marriage, the labour market, and familial transmission of property and other resources.
Feminist legal strategies could benefit from considering the limits on legal change in this
context: what strategic engagement with law might be useful and what requires more
systemic change?
Feminist voices calling for a return to materialist analysis stress strategies deriving from
collective action and collective (rather than individual or private) responsibility for all in
society in order to combat oppression. This approach might provide an avenue, potentially, to
move beyond differences based on identity, keeping in mind the insights of postmodern and
intersectional analysis. While some focus on differences (e.g. between women and men) might
be needed to ground claims about oppression and to consider remedies in an unequal world,
a focus on collective responsibility could empower all, across differences.
Conclusion
Our review leads us to differ from those who observe that few feminist legal scholars in
academia now devote time to activism, advocacy or practice (Bartlett 2012, 429), thus
diminishing the dialectical relationship between scholarship and practice. As we have seen,
‘feminist legal thought is often “applied” theory because it uses theory to critique a practical
area of activity’ (Davies 2007: 651-652). For instance, feminist legal theory has been used to
rewrite judicial decisions from a feminist perspective (Majury 2006, Hunter et al 2010,
Enright et al 2017). Another example is that intersectionality theory has been employed to
subject the operations of Royal Commissions to critical analysis for their failure to take
appropriate account of racism and the experiences of racialized women (e.g. Marchetti 2008).
Moreover, at least in the Canadian context, many (perhaps most) feminist legal scholars are
engaged in some activist or legal advocacy work, although the pressures of academia may
restrict these efforts.
One recent example is the attention to issues of sexual harassment and sexual assault on
university campuses and the involvement of feminist legal scholars in institutional or activist
responses to it. In Canada, many prominent feminist legal scholars have played leadership
roles in leading institutional responses to sexual assault on campus, pushing for more
fundamental, survivor-focused, change. With respect to sexual harassment, prominent
feminist scholar Sara Ahmed resigned her position as Director of the Centre for Feminist
Research at Goldsmiths University due to the university’s failure to meaningfully address
instances of sexual harassment that she and others, including many students, had been raising
for some time. Ahmed’s recent book, Living a Feminist Life (2017), and her blog
feministkilljoys.com, provide important, current examples of feminist praxis. The figure of the
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feminist killjoy reclaims the stereotype of humourless feminist, calling out sexism, racism, and
other forms of injustice, while being committed to building a better, less oppressive world.
Conaghan (2013) links any gap between theory and activism to a divide between the
discursive and the material, and argues for attention to the relation between the world and
our knowledge of it (47). In so doing, she emphasizes ‘the need to resist conceptualizations of
feminist legal engagement as either material or discursive, modern or postmodern, reformbased or theoretical’ as the outcomes of legal engagements will be shaped by both language
and reality. We endorse this sentiment and urge that legal scholars of the future draw on
useful tools from the extensive history of feminist thought and on the urgency felt by many
activists for pragmatic engagement with fields that generate oppression or that offer a path
forward.
Recalling the words and the work of Carol Smart, we suggest that feminist legal scholars and
the journals that publish their work recall the importance of empirical, theoretical and
historical scholarship, sometimes done separately and sometimes integrated (Smart 1999:
391). As Maureen Cain has suggested, once we have deconstructed the ways in which law too
often disempowers its would-be users, we must turn to the possibilities for reconstruction,
requiring ‘a relational politics, of people coming together to develop their arguments, find
channels for the dissemination of their ideas, decide how best to influence others’ (Cain 2002:
383).
Franke has observed that ‘we disagree badly as feminists’ (2003, 641). We may overly police
the boundaries of our field, particularly as feminist legal scholarship has grown and become a
discipline in its own right; or we may take disagreements too personally. This is partly
because the personal is indeed the political and we are deeply invested in the work we do.
But, as Ahmed (2017) writes, feminism is a way of life, a movement, a world-building project.
We will get our hands dirty and we will be bruised along the way. Brooks (2015) has
observed that ‘[f]eminism is not something you put on or try out like a coat or something you
look through like a window or a pair of glasses. It is a dream’ (208). Feminist legal scholarship
is strongest when we are able to talk across differences in analysis and strategy and, yes, to
dream a better world. Working on this article together and coming, as we do, from different
generations of feminist legal scholars, prompted us to talk through differences and to find a
way to discuss them. Academic publishing can play a role in facilitating dialogues across
differences as well as generations, and we look forward to many more years of SLS providing
such a venue.
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